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Liebesman: Ex Parte Seizures and DTSA

Symposium Article
Ex Parte Seizures Under the DTSA and the Shift of IP Rights
Enforcement
Yvette Joy Liebesman*
Abstract
The ex parte seizure provision of the Defend Trade Secrets
Act is another step in a long line of legislation that shifts the
costs of private enforcement to the public, which already has
a toehold in copyright and trademark law. The ex parte
provision—which is not incorporated into any state trade
secret law—relieves rights owners of two “burdens.” First,
it relieves the trade secret owner of the burden of actually
having to compete in the marketplace. Second, it relieves the
trade secret owner of the burden of the costs associated with
the discovery process of a lawsuit. The effect of this cost
shifting results in anticompetitive behavior, is ripe for abuse,
and offers no added benefit to what is provided via state
trade secret causes of action and remedies.

This essay is based on Professor Yvette Joy Liebesman’s presentation at the
March 10, 2017 Symposium on “Implementing and Interpreting the Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2016,” hosted by the University of Missouri School of Law’s
Center for Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship and the School’s Business,
Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article will discuss the provision under the federal Defend
Trade Secrets Act1 (“DTSA”) that allows for ex parte seizures of goods
which are alleged to be produced via the misappropriation of trade secrets
and materials that are alleged to contain misappropriated trade secrets—
such as laptops, media storage, and paper documents.2 Several trade secret
scholars have written extensively regarding substantive issues surrounding
the ex parte seizure provision and its enforcement.3 This article focuses on
how the ex parte seizure provision follows a trend by which rights owners
have steadily sought to shift enforcement of private intellectual property
rights from themselves to taxpayers and other entities.
Cost shifting has become so ubiquitous that we do not even realize
it is happening. For example, we have all seen these notices: “go green,”
“get your bank statement, credit card bill, or W-2 online”, and “save the
planet!” However, many of us want that paper copy. So, if I choose to “go
green” and have the document sent to me electronically, what is really
happening is cost shifting. When a document is sent to consumers through
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Prof. Dennis Crouch and the editors of the Missouri Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax
Law Review for organizing the symposium, and for the invitation to participate. She is
also grateful for comments and suggestions from David Levine, and for the help of her
very capable research assistant, Rachel Jag.
1
Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
2
See, e.g., Earthbound Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc., 2016 WL 4418013, at *11 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) (ordering Defendants to “immediately deliver to a neutral thirdparty expert in the greater Seattle area all flash drives, SD cards, cell phones, and other
external drives used by the individual defendants . . . that are in Defendants' possession,
custody, or control.”).
3
See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 284 (2015) [hereinafter Ex Parte Seizures]; David S. Levine &
Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. Rev.
ONLINE 230 (2015); Eric Goldman et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R. 3326), CYBERLAW.STANFORD.EDU 1 (Nov. 17,
2015),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposi
tion%20to%20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Professors’ Letter].
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the U.S. Postal Service, the institution that created the document pays for
the printing and mailing.4 Alternatively, if the document is sent
electronically, those costs are absorbed by consumers who choose to “go
green,” but still want the paper document. Similarly, this cost shifting has
been an ongoing theme with intellectual property law enforcement; the
latest target is enforcement of trade secrets through the ex parte seizure
provision under the federal DTSA, a right not provided by any state trade
secret statute.5
The DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision relieves rights owners of two
“burdens.” First, it relieves the trade secret owner of the burden of actually
having to compete in the marketplace.6 Second, it relieves the trade secret
owner of the burden of the costs associated with the discovery process of a
lawsuit.7 Thus, this provision has the strong potential to become an anticompetitive arrow in intellectual property owners’ quivers.
II.

THE COST SHIFTING EVOLUTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

Before delving into the ex parte seizure provision as a new
enforcement tool found within the DTSA, this article will first illustrate how
this trend of enforcement shifting—and thus, cost shifting— is already
present with trademark and copyright rights.8
4

See generally Jane Porter, 10 Ways to Trim Shipping Costs, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 17,
2012), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/224619.
5
Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 285.
6
Eric Goldman, David S. Levine, & Sharon K. Sandeen, Federal Trade Secret Bill ReIntroduced—and It’s Still Troublesome, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/08/federal-trade-secret-bill-re-introduced-andits-still-troublesome-guest-blog-post.htm.
7
See William P. Glenn, Jr., Ex-Parte Seizure of Intellectual Property Goods, 9 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L. J. 307, 309 (2001).
8
Another area where cost shifting has occurred—with serious constitutional
implications—is in the criminal justice system, local governments have shifted the
burden of trials and custody from taxpayers to defendants—even when acquitted—
to cover court/trial and custodial costs. See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees
Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor
(noting that while this is a shift from public to private cost shifting, it shifts the
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Trademark and copyright owners have been successful in
persuading Congress to legislatively expand and shift enforcement duties to
governmental bodies and other entities regarding private intellectual
property rights beyond customary importation authority.9
1. Stopping the Importation of Counterfeit Goods at the Border via
Customs and Border Patrol, and the Importance of Having a
Registered Mark
Under both the Lanham Act10 and the Tariff Act of 1930,11 Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”) has long had the authority to seize
counterfeit goods at the border. 12 At ports of entry, CBP personnel regularly

financial burden onto defendants rather than the party instigating the court action,
the government).
9
See Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Oversees, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/protectingintellectual-property-rights-ipr (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
10
15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012) (“[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or
simulate the name of any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any
manufacturer or trader located in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law
affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, or which shall copy or simulate
a trademark registered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter . . . shall be
admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States[.]”); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b)(1)
(2016) (“CBP may detain any article of domestic or foreign manufacture imported into
the United States that bears a mark suspected by CBP of being a counterfeit version of a
mark that is registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”).
11
See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(b) (2012) (“Any such merchandise imported into the United
States in violation of the provisions of this section shall be subject to seizure and
forfeiture for violation of the customs laws.”); see also Customs Border Protection
Increases Seizure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods in 2008, SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP
(Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.shipmangoodwin.com/customs-border-protection-increasesseizure-of-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods-in-2008.
12
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a) (“A ‘counterfeit mark’ is a spurious mark that is identical with,
or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the Principal Register of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”) (emphasis added).
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seize counterfeit and otherwise infringing toys, computers, DVD, handbags,
apparel, shoes, and consumer electronics.13
The reliance on CBP to seize counterfeit goods is a huge benefit to
the rights owners. We are probably all familiar with the recent Supreme
Court decision of Matal v. Tam, where the Court held that the United States
Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) ban on registering offensive
marks under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act14 was an unconstitutional viewpoint
restriction on speech.15 What would have happened if the Supreme Court
had upheld the Trademark Office’s ability to refuse registration of offensive
marks? In Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court explained that,
[w]ithout federal registration, a valid
trademark may still be used in commerce.
And an unregistered trademark can be
enforced against would-be infringers in
several ways. Most important, even if a
trademark is not federally registered, it may
still be enforceable under §43(a) of the
Lanham Act, which creates a federal cause of
action for trademark infringement . . .
[u]nregistered trademarks may also be
entitled to protection under other federal
13

See Reinaldo Rodriguez, CBP Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Statistics FY 2016,
TAGGART INT’L, LTD. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.taggart-intl.com/cbp-intellectualproperty-rights-seizure-statistics-fy-2016/; see also Thomas C. Frohlich, Alexander E.M.
Hess, & Vince Calio, 9 Most Counterfeited Products in the USA, USA TODAY (Mar. 29,
2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/03/29/24-7-wall-stcounterfeited-products/7023233/.
14
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
15
Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (holding that the Patent and Trademark
Office’s denial of a trademark registration “application based on a provision of federal
law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or bring . . . into
contemp[t] or disrepute’ any ‘persons, living or dead’ . . . violates the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may
not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”) (internal citation
omitted).
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statutes, such as the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act . . . . And an
unregistered trademark can be enforced
under state common law, or if it has been
registered in a State, under that State’s
registration system.16
While the Court explicitly stated that it would not decide whether a
mark owner “could bring suit under § 43(a) if his application for federal
registration had been lawfully denied under the disparagement clause,”17
this discussion will assume that a ban on registerability under § 2 of the
Lanham Act18 will not render the mark unenforceable as an unregistered
mark under § 43(a)(1)(A).19 Why would Dan Snyder, owner of the
Washington, D.C. professional football team,20 or the National Football
League care about registration if they can continue to enforce their offensive
mark that disparages native Americans as an unregistered mark under §
43(a)(1)(A)? Because, as noted by the Supreme Court, if they want

16

Id. at 1752-53 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 1753.
18
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (listing additional grounds for refusal of registration that are
still in effect after the Tam decision).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012)
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses
in commerce any word, term, name symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation or origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representing of fact, which is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
such act.
(emphasis in original).
20
Dan Snyder, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/profile/dan-snyder/.
17
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governmental authorities to stop infringing goods from entering the country,
the mark owner must present a valid registration to CBP.21
Both § 42 of the Lanham Act22 and § 526 of the Tariff Act of 193023
prohibit the importation of merchandise bearing a registered trademark
without the mark owner’s consent, therefore, no registration of the mark
translates to no CBP.24 Without registration of their mark, Dan Snyder and
the NFL would still be able to sue infringers and sue for damages and
21

See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (“Registration . . . enables the
trademark holder to stop the importation into the United States of articles bearing an
infringing mark.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
(2012)
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package,
wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a
corporation or association created or organized within, the United States,
and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office. . . . a copy of the
certificate of registration of his trademark . . .shall be kept . . . in the
Department of the Treasury. . . and thereupon the Secretary of the Treasury
shall cause one or more copies of the same to be transmitted to each
collector or other proper officer of customs.
(emphasis added).
22
15 U.S.C. § 1124.
23
19 U.S.C. § 1526.
24
Though because there are situations where it be difficult for CBP agents to determine
when goods are, in fact, counterfeit, enforcement is discretionary. See Olympus Corp. v.
U.S., 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986)
The administrative difficulties inherent in requiring the Customs Service to
exclude gray market goods make clear why Customs has long and
consistently interpreted section 526 to allow it to refuse to exclude the
goods. Absent this bright line for administrative enforcement, the Customs
Service would expend resources excluding goods when later private
litigation could disclose that the markholder lacked isolable domestic good
will and was merely engaging in price discrimination or other behavior
questionable as a matter of antitrust law. Regulations that attempted to
permit exclusion only of goods the markholders of which possessed
discrete domestic good will would . . . place the Customs Service in the
position of having to determine at the time of border crossing whether the
domestic trademark holder had developed an independent public image in
this country.”)
(internal citation and quotations omitted).
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forfeiture of the infringing goods via § 43 of the Lanham Act, but at their
own expense.25 Thus, owning a registered mark has a major impact on who
can enforce the mark owner’s rights, and who bears the costs of policing
and enforcement.
2. Expansion of Trademark Customs and Border Patrol Through
Website Seizures

With enforcement against bulk importers of counterfeit and pirated
physical goods safely in the hands of CBP, IP owners had another avenue
that they wanted to address. The internet marketplace allowed for smallscale importation that could easily slip through Custom’s net.26
Consequently, mark owners needed a new enforcement mechanism to
handle these businesses, and thus, found a way to prevent these
importations—domain name seizure through civil forfeiture proceedings
under provisions in the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (“PRO-IP Act”).27 The PRO-IP Act
dramatically changed the forfeiture landscape,28

25

15 U.S.C. § 1125.
See Andrew Sellars, The In Rem Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain Names,
SSRN 1-2 (May 9, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1835604.
27
18 U.S.C. § 2323 (2012).
28
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110–403, § 206(a), 122 Stat. 4256, 4262.
26
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[t]he newly created [s]ection 2323 of Title 18
established that articles, ‘the making or
trafficking of which are prohibited’ by a
series of IP laws—including criminal
copyright infringement, trafficking in
counterfeit goods or labels falsely identifying
copyrighted works as genuine, and
unauthorized recordings of live musical
performances or films being shown in
theatres—are subject to forfeiture.29
Any property used for these purposes—and this was interpreted to include
website domains—was now subject to civil forfeiture.30
One consequence of these new enforcement tools is the increased
probability that sites hosting non-infringing works and goods would be
seized.31 Abuse of the seizure authority would harm online businesses, such
as what happened to Rojodirecta.32 Rojodirecta was a target under
“Operation In our Sites,” an ICE program that began in 2008 to remove
allegedly infringing websites by seizing U.S.-registered domain names
believed to be associated with piracy or counterfeiting.33 Rojodirecta was
seized in 2011 during Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s annual
“Super Bowl Seizure Spree,” where domain names were seized that were
alleged to be infringing on NFL marks or illegally streaming games.34 ICE

29

Sellars, supra note 26, at 7-8.
Id. at 11.
31
Nate Anderson, US Customs Begins Pre-Super Bowl Online Mole-Whack, ARS
TECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:13 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/uscustoms-begins-pre-super-bowl-mole-whacking/; Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 30002 (describing the damage to Rojadirecta, Dajaz1, and other websites caused by the
erroneous seizure of these websites).
32
Anderson, supra note 31.
33
Sellars, supra note 26, at 11.
34
Nate Anderson, Government Admits Defeat, Gives Back Seized Rojadirecta Domains,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:23 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/08/government-goes-0-2-admits-defeat-in-rojadirecta-domain-forfeit-case/.
30
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obtained a civil forfeiture order against Rojodirecta, relying on information
from the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”).35
After 18 months of stonewalling by the RIAA, however, claiming it
had evidence of the direct infringement required under the law, but never
producing it—the federal government dropped its seizure claim against the
service.36 Rojodirecta was one of only two website domains among 80
seized that challenged its forfeiture order.37 The other site was Dajaz1, a
popular hip-hop music blog, was also successful in eventually having its
domain name returned, again for lack of evidence.38 The others did not have
the resources to challenge the seizure, and there is no way to know how
many of them were not infringing, but merely lacked the resources to mount
a legal fight.39
Challenging the forfeiture order was an expensive, time-consuming
process and both Rojodirecta and Dajaz1 were harmed during the seizure
by the shutdown of their websites.40 Even though the RIAA and Motion
Picture Association of America’s (“MPAA”) lost their proxy-fought court
battle, they were also winners because they were able to shut down websites
that legitimately competed with RIAA and MPAA members—and the costs
were born by the U.S. government and the defendant website owners.41
A. Copyright
Along with stronger customs enforcement at ports of entry and
seizures of websites, copyright owners have lobbied Congress to pass
legislation that would expand seizure to domestic websites and otherwise
shift enforcement of rights.42 Most of these attempts have failed, though
there have been several successes.
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
John R. Allison et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to “Preventing Real Online
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011”
36
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1. Failed Attempts to Shift Civil IP Enforcement to the Department
of Justice
The entertainment industry has had several failed efforts to create
dubious governmental enforcement mechanisms and relieve itself of the
burden of fairly competing in the marketplace.43 One example is the
proposed, but never enacted, Combating Online Infringement and
Counterfeits Act (“COICA”), which would have allowed ex parte
governmental seizure of a website's domain name, 44 if it "ha[d] no
demonstrable, commercially significant purpose or use other than" offering
or providing access to unauthorized copies of copyrighted works.45 This
seizure was broadly protested due to the limited due process rights afforded
the domain name owner prior to the seizure.46 Many of COICA’s
questionable anti-competitive provisions were resurrected in the also-failed

(PROTECT-IP Act of 2011, S. 968), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 5, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/document/law-professors-letter-sopa.
43
See Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. § 2
(2010); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2012) (introduced in the House of
Representatives as the “Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act.”); Stop Online
Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
44
S. 3804.
45
Id. § 2(a)(1)(B).
46
See Mark Lemley, David S. Levine, & David G. Post, DON’T BREAK THE
INTERNET, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2011) (arguing that SOPA and PIPA “share an
underlying approach and an enforcement philosophy that pose grave constitutional
problems and that could have potentially disastrous consequences for the stability and
security of the Internet’s addressing system, for the principle of interconnectivity that has
helped drive the Internet’s extraordinary growth, and for free expression.”); see also
Allison, supra note 42.
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Protect IP Act (“PIPA”)47 and the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”)48
bills.49
The PRO-IP Act50 originally contained a provision, later removed,
which gave the Justice Department the authority to bring civil suits against
patent and copyright infringers, and turn over damages to the IP owners.51
This civil suit provision drew heavy fire not only from online rights’ groups,
who blasted it as an "enormous gift" to large content owners, but also from
the Justice Department itself. 52 In a letter to the Chairman and Ranking
47

S. 968.
H.R. 3261; see also, Annemarie Bridy, Notice and Takedown in the Domain Name
System: ICANN’s Ambivalent Drift into Online Content Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1343, 1363 (2017) (“In 2010, a bill called COICA, which contained provisions
similar to those that later appeared in SOPA, was introduced in the Senate but failed to
advance.”).
49
SOPA/PIPA: Internet Blacklist Legislation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-censorship-and-copyright-bill (last visited Dec.
8, 2017).
50
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110–403, 122 Stat. 4256.
51
See Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act, S. 3325, 110th Cong. (2008)
TITLE I—Authorization of civil copyright enforcement by attorney
general; SEC. 101. Civil penalties for certain violations. (a) In
general—Chapter 5 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after section 506 the following:
SEC. 506a. Civil penalties for violations of section 506. (a) In
general—In lieu of a criminal action under section 506, the Attorney
General may commence a civil action in the appropriate United States
district court against any person who engages in conduct constituting
an offense under section 506. Upon proof of such conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil
penalty under section 504 which shall be in an amount equal to the
amount which would be awarded under section 3663(a)(1)(B) of title
18 and restitution to the copyright owner aggrieved by the conduct.
(emphasis added); see also Nate Anderson, New IP Task Force Brings “Stronger and
Stricter Enforcement”, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 16, 2010), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2010/02/new-ip-task-force-brings-stronger-and-stricter-enforcement/.
52
Am. Assoc. of Law Libraries et al., Concerns Regarding S. 3325, The Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights Act of 2008, WIRED.COM (Sept. 10, 2008),
https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/copyrightactletter.pdf
48

401
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/4

12

Liebesman: Ex Parte Seizures and DTSA

Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legislative Affairs contended that the proposed law
threatened to turn government attorneys into "pro bono lawyers for private
copyright holders regardless of their resources.”53 The language was
stripped from the final enacted version of the bill.54
2. Successful Copyright Enforcement Shifts
Intellectual Property rights’ organizations have also had some
legislative success. Two examples are (1) the IP enforcement provisions in
the Higher Education Opportunity Act Amendment signed in 2008;55 and
Section 101 would be an enormous gift of federal resources to large
copyright owners with no demonstration that the copyright owners are
having difficulties enforcing their own rights. For example, the recording
industry has threatened or filed over 30,000 lawsuits against individual
consumers. Movie and television producers, software publishers, music
publishers, and print publishers all have their own enforcement programs.
There is absolutely no reason for the federal government to assume this
private enforcement role.
53
Keith B. Nelson & Lily Fu Claffee, S. 3325 - Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights Act, PUBLICKNOWLEDGE.ORG (Sept. 23, 2008),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/doj-letter-20080923.pdf (“Title 1's departure from
the settled framework above could result in Department of Justice prosecutors serving as
pro bono lawyers for private copyright holders regardless of their resources. In effect,
taxpayer-supported Department lawyers would pursue lawsuits for copyright holders,
with monetary recovery going to industry.”).
54
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256.
55
Institutional and Financial Assistance Information for Students, 20 U.S.C.A. §
1092(a)(1)(P) (West 2017)
Information dissemination activities. Each eligible institution participating
in any program under this subchapter shall carry out information
dissemination activities for prospective and enrolled students. The
information required by this section shall accurately describe institutional
policies and sanctions related to copyright infringement, including—
(i) an annual disclosure that explicitly informs students that unauthorized
distribution of copyrighted material, including unauthorized peer-to-peer
file sharing, may subject the students to civil and criminal liabilities;
(ii) a summary of the penalties for violation of Federal copyright laws; and
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(2) the enhanced Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(“ICANN”) enforcement of intellectual property rights.56
In the Higher Education Opportunity Act Amendment of 2008,
entertainment industry associations successfully lobbied for legislation that
turned universities into its enforcers,57 responsible for policing students’ use
of the internet for infringing activities.58 Through a new provision of the
Higher Education Opportunity Act reauthorization of 2008, U.S. colleges
and universities had general requirements imposed on them regarding
unauthorized file sharing, including: (1) the dissemination of an annual
disclosure to students describing copyright law and campus policies relating
to infringement of copyright law;59 and (2) a plan to “effectively” combat
the unauthorized distribution of copyright materials on their networks.60 To
comply with this latter requirement, many schools enacted policies whereby
students faced sanctions including losing access to the school’s internet
service and academic suspension.61 Thus, to receive federal funds, schools

(iii) a description of the institution’s policies with respect to unauthorized
peer-to-peer file sharing, including disciplinary actions that are taken
against students who engage in unauthorized distribution of copyrighted
materials using the institution’s information technology system.
56
Dugie Standeford, ICANN Is Moving Toward Copyright Enforcement, Academic Says,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/02/28/icannmoving-toward-copyright-enforcement-academic-says/.
57
Specifically, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) lobbied for this legislation.
58
See William E. Kirwan, Letter Opposing the Inclusion of the Entertainment Industry
Proposal on Illegal File Sharing in the HEA, EDUCAUSE.EDU (Nov. 7, 2007),
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/CSD5226.pdf.
59
20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(a)(1)(P).
60
Id.
61
See, e.g., Information Technology Services: Copyright FAQs, ST. LOUIS U.,
https://www.slu.edu/its/policies/dmca/copyright-law-faqs (last visited Dec. 8, 2017)
Q: What happens if the violation notice leads to your computer?
A: When Saint Louis University receives a violation notice, ITSC notifies
the network user that they must remove or disable access to the infringing
material on their computer. Upon a second notification to a student, network
access for their personal computer will be suspended, and the matter will be
referred to the Office Student Conduct for appropriate disciplinary action.
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had to police students’ internet use and become copyright enforcers for the
rights holders, shifting the burden and the costs associated with it.62
The expansion of ICANN’s enforcement of IP rights also shifted
costs away from copyright and trademark owners.63 In 1998, under contract
with the U.S. Department of Commerce, ICANN was formed as a privatesector non-profit corporation to manage and oversee governance and
administration of the internet’s underlying address system, the Domain
Name System (“DNS”).64 “ICANN was not created or intended to be an
intellectual property enforcer but it was drawn from its inception into
disputes over trademark rights in domain names” when, in 1999, “Congress
amended the Lanham Act to include the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (“ACPA”), [which created] a [federal] cause of action . . .
for bad-faith registration of a domain name containing a protected
trademark.”65 ICANN almost simultaneously adopted the Uniform Domain

Upon a third notification ITSC will terminate network access for anyone
who repeatedly infringes on the rights of copyright holders.
(emphasis added); see also Copyright Infringement and Illegal File Sharing,
VILL. U.,
http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/unit/policies/AcceptableUse/copyright.htm
(last visited Dec. 8, 2017)
2.2 Penalties for Copyright Infringement
The unauthorized copying, sharing or distribution of copyrighted material is
strictly prohibited. It is a violation of federal law, the Copyright Act, and of
the Code of Student Conduct. Students who infringe a copyright are subject
to disciplinary action under the Code of Student Conduct, up to and
including expulsion.
(emphasis added).
62
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(P).
63
Professor Annemarie Bridy has written about the substance of ICANN’s expansion into
copyright enforcement. See Bridy, supra note 48, at 1346.
64
Id. at 1349.
65
Id. at 1353, 1355 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012) (“A person shall be
liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark . . . if, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties, that person . . . has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark . . .
and registers . . . a domain name that . . . is identical or confusingly similar to that
mark.”)).
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Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) for adjudicating fights over
domain names containing trademarked words and phrases.66
ICANN has insisted that its sphere of operations and responsibilities
do not include copyright enforcement; “ICANN has historically recognized
that its role as an online intellectual property enforcer stops at trademarks
in domain names and does not extend to copyrights in online content.”67
Corporate copyright owners, however, lobbied to shift enforcement
responsibilities, and thus the costs, to ICANN,68 contending that “all online
intermediaries, including those that operate the DNS, should be responsible
for enforcing copyrights.”69 To accommodate these rights owners, while
avoiding direct involvement in copyright enforcement activities, in 2013,
ICANN altered its contracts with DNS intermediaries to support “a system
of extra-judicial, notice-driven sanctions . . . includ[ing] cancellation of
domain names for ‘pirate sites’ about which right holders complain.”70
Other ICANN contract modifications facilitated the MPAA’s “trusted
notifier” enforcement program that utilized registry operators,71 thus,
shifting this cost of enforcement of IP rights away from the rights owners.
III.

ENFORCEMENT SHIFT
DTSA

THROUGH EX PARTE SEIZURES UNDER THE

The shift of enforcement costs from rights owners to others—in this
case, the federal government—is again illustrated in the ex parte
enforcement provision of the DTSA, even though its omission from state
trade secret laws has not hindered adequate remedies for trade secret
misappropriation.72 Its drafters’ claim that this provision seeks to prevent
foreign corporate espionage is spurious at best. 73
66

Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1346-47.
68
Id. at 1347.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1348.
72
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
73
See Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 289-90 (noting that the idea of heading to the
airport with trade secrets “sounds like the premise of a Hollywood blockbuster movie, but
67
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A. State Trade Secret laws
Forty-seven states have adopted, for the most part, the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act,74 and these state laws have been a satisfactory means of
redress.75 None of these state trade secret laws have an ex parte seizure
process similar to the provision in the DTSA.76 Businesses are able to obtain
relief via the seizure of goods created based on the trade secret
misappropriation, as well as the misappropriated trade secrets themselves
through traditional injunctive relieve available under state trade secret law,
as well as under the Lanham Act’s unfair competition provisions.77 There
also does not seem to have been a problem with regard to capturing large
monetary awards under state trade secret laws. For example, in 2016, Epic
Systems procured a $940 million judgment against the Tata Consulting
Group for misappropriating proprietary computer code.78 In 2014, the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Seagate Technology’s massive

. . . if someone is truly ‘heading to the airport,’ the trade secret owner needs a faster
mechanism than any court can provide.” (quoting Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014:
Hearing on H.R. 5233 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 413-20, 511–
14, 572-73 (2014) (statements of Rep. Goodlatte and Rep. Nadler, who asserted that the
ex parte seizure provision “will stop thieves planning to flee the country with stolen
American property”)).
74
New York, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have not adopted the UTSA, though
North Carolina’s trade secret law closely resembles the Uniform Trade Secret Act. See
Trade Secrets Act: Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Dec.8,
2017).
75
See Rob Shwarts & Cam Phan, UPDATE: Money, Money, Money: Top 10 Trade Secret
Verdicts (With Our Runner-Up Overturned), ORRICK (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2014/04/07/update-money-money-moneytop-10-trade-secret-verdicts-with-our-runner-up-overturned/.
76
Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 285-86.
77
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
78
Epic Systems Wins $940 Mln U.S. Jury Verdict in Tata Trade Secret Case,
REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tata-epic-verdictidUSKCN0XD135.

406
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

17

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 4

arbitration award of $630 million over Western Digital Corporation.79 In
2011, St. Jude Medical won a $2.3 billion judgment against Nervicon,80
which was later reduced to $947 million.81
But lawsuits and arbitration are expensive. Just in terms of
discovery, a plaintiff must request relevant materials, respond to inquiries
and objections, store the materials, and review what could be thousands of
records.82 And unless it is enjoined via a traditional, non-ex parte
proceeding,83 the defendant business may be able to continue to innovate
and compete without being deprived of its resources.
B. Ex Parte Seizures under the Defend Trade Secrets Act
Despite adequate remedies at the state level, there was a push for a
federal cause of action, and what was legislated closely resembled the
Uniform Trade Secret Act with one big exception—the ex parte procedure
provision.84 As noted in the introduction, this provision is the major
difference between the state and federal laws,85 and the ex parte provision
under the DTSA relieves the plaintiff trade secret owner of two burdens: (1)

79

Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Dig. Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. 2014) (affirming
the decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals to reinstate the arbitration award in full).
80
Pacesetter Inc. v. Nervicon Co. Ltd., No. BC424443, 2011 WL 2714864 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Apr. 22, 2011) (verdict and settlement summary).
81
Shwarts & Phan, supra note 75.
82
How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_
network/how_courts_work/discovery.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
83
See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 14–cv–748–wmc, 2016
WL 1696912, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 27, 2016) (whereby after winning a jury verdict of
trade secret misappropriation, the court granted the plaintiffs request for permanent
injunction).
84
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
85
See Ex Parte Seizure, supra note 3, at 285. “Doctrinally, the Seizure Provision would
represent unprecedented innovation. No state trade secret law has a trade secret-specific
ex parte seizure process similar to the Seizure Provision” (citing The Trade Secrets
Protection Act of 2014: Hearing on H.R. 5233 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 413-20 (2014) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
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the burden of actually having to compete in the marketplace; and (2) the
burden of the costs associated with the discovery process of a lawsuit. 86
Under the DTSA, if a company believes its trade secrets have been
stolen, it can seek a court order to seize the trade secrets—and take
possession of the computers, flash drives, cell phones, and any other device
in which the trade secrets allegedly reside,87 without providing notice to the
defendant.88 Federal Marshals can show up at the alleged offender’s door
and confiscate computers, cell phones, flash drives, and other documents.89
A special master appointed by the court must then review all the materials
to identify any misappropriated content, preserve it, and remove it from the
defendant’s computers, if necessary.90 The court may also employ technical
experts to assist in these tasks.91 These tasks consume time, labor, and skill
mainly at the expense of the courts, not the plaintiff.92

86

See Ex Parte Seizure, supra note 3, at 285-88.
Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra, No. 2:16-CV-524-PPS-JEM, 2017 WL 365619,
at *4 (D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2017) (internal citations omitted).
88
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“. . . the court may, upon ex parte application . . .
issue an order providing for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation
or dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of the action.”).
89
Id. § (b)(2)(B)(iv) (“If an order is issued . . . it shall . . . provide guidance to the law
enforcement officials executing the seizure that clearly delineates the scope of the
authority of the officials.”); Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 290 (noting that “[T]he
Seizure Provision . . . allows seizure of every . . . copy of allegedly stolen information,
which could include every computer that contains one or more stolen files, along with
any hard copy files containing printouts. Read literally, every storage medium of a
departing employee’s new employer potentially would be subject to seizure. A thorough
seizure in a departing employee situation could easily shut down the new employer until
the hearing.”).
90
§ 1836(b)(2)(D)(iv) (“The court may appoint a special master to locate and isolate all
misappropriated trade secret information and to facilitate the return of unrelated property
and data to the person from whom the property was seized.”).
91
Id. § (b)(2)(E) (“At the request of law enforcement officials, the court may allow a
technical expert who is unaffiliated with the applicant and who is bound by a courtapproved non-disclosure agreement to participate in the seizure if the court determines
that the participation of the expert will aid the efficient execution of and minimize the
burden of the seizure.”).
92
Id.
87

408
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

19

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 4

The plaintiff business is supposedly prohibited from directly
accessing these seized materials.93 In the meantime, however, the court has
appropriated the tools necessary for the defendant business to function,
beyond the supposed trade secret.94 “A seizure could massively disrupt a
targeted business, temporarily shut it down,” or even kill it.95 The plaintiff
company has effectively eliminated its competition without any litigation.
There is no need to compete in the marketplace through innovation or by
producing higher quality products when one can use the government to shut
down the competition. This legislation has created an extreme remedy
whereby the trade secret plaintiffs can claim any basis to argue that things
have to happen quickly, and without notice, in order to preserve their trade
secret from misappropriation.96
This expansion of rights can easily lead to anti-competitive abuse.97
Start-up companies would be especially vulnerable when faced with the
sudden seizure of their computers, documents, and other items that may
contain unrelated material, including their own trade secrets, with no
recourse until they are released at another hearing or at the end of
adjudication.98 And again, we see a cost shifting to taxpayers—for a mere
93

Id. § (b)(2)(B).
Id. § 1 (b)(2)(A)-(B).
95
Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 293.
96
§ 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii).
97
See generally Levine & Sandeen, supra note 3, at 244-45; Professors’ Letter, supra
note 3, at 3-4 (describing how the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision could be abused to
harm competition by small businesses and start-ups); Brook K. Baker et al., Professors’
Letter in Opposition to the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (S.2267) and the “Trade
Secret Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233), SSRN 4-5 (Aug. 26, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699735 (describing how the
DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision could be used for anti-competitive purposes).
98
Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 294
For well-established businesses with predictable revenues and costs, it may
be possible to non-speculatively estimate the costs and foregone revenues
from a wrongful seizure. In contrast, thinly resourced start-up enterprises
could suffer less clear consequences from a wrongful seizure. As we are
increasingly seeing small start-ups blossom into Unicorns and Decacorns, a
disrupted start-up may lose billions of dollars of market cap potential.36
Judges will be reluctant to award large and seemingly speculative
94
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$2,000 fee,99 seizure necessary for the preservation of evidence is
performed by officers of the court. 100 Thus, ex parte seizure is an
unprecedented remedy that can be used to effectively shut down legitimate
competition.
Take for example, Surendra Mishra, who was accused of
misappropriation of trade secrets by his employer, Magnesita
Refractories.101 Mishra’s laptop was seized, and he no longer had access to
anything on it because his employer thought he might be conspiring to
misappropriate trade secrets.102 In this instance, the court gave Mishra’s
computers to his employer, who asked for access to the laptop for 48 hours
so it could be imaged and returned, despite the prohibition of this action
under the DTSA.103 Magnesita had possession of Mishra’s own
independently created confidential material.104 Magnesita was able to stifle
its competitor without having to actually compete. Magnesita did this at
little cost to itself.105 A preservation order could have served the same
compensating damages to an unproven start-up, even if a seizure
permanently diminishes or destroys its business.
99
See, e.g., Mission Capital Advisors, LLC v. Romaka, No. 1:16-cv-05878-LLS, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (Santa Clara Law Digital Commons) (ordering the plaintiff to
“pay a non-refundable fee of $2,000 to the U.S. Marshal to cover the cost of effectuating
the seizure”).
100
Jeanne M. Gills, What’s Reasonable?—Protecting and Enforcing Trade Secrets in the
Digital Age, FOLEY,
https://www.foley.com/files/uploads/AIPLA%20Article%20on%20DTSA%20and%20Re
asonable%20Efforts%20to%20Protect%20Trade%20Secrets%2048.pdf (last visited Dec.
8, 2017) (Section “1836(b) authorizes a federal court to issue an order in extraordinary
circumstances and upon an ex parte application (based on a sworn declaration or verified
complaint) to provide for seizure of property where necessary to preserve evidence or
prevent dissemination of the trade secret.”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VII) (“[T]he
person against whom seizure would be ordered, or persons acting in concert with such
person, would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the
court, if the applicant were to proceed on notice to such person.”).
101
Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra, No. 2:16-CV-524-PPS-JEM, 2017 WL 365619,
at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2017).
102
Id.
103
Id. at *2.
104
Id. at *1.
105
Id. at *2.
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purpose, and was already available under existing laws and court
procedures, without these benefits to Magnesita.
As for the shifting of costs associated with the discovery process of
a lawsuit, the trade secret owner can use the government seizure and review
of materials as a substitute for the discovery process that would normally
be at the plaintiff’s expense.106 The task of identifying the relevant evidence
for collection, preservation, and destruction is transformed into an allencompassing sweep-up by U.S. Marshals of documents, computers, and
anything else that “may” contain the allegedly stolen trade secret.107 The
court stores these materials.108 The appointed special master, who can hire
technical experts to assist in the task, reviews the materials for relevancy.109
The special master examines, isolates trade secret information, and
facilitates the return of unrelated property.110 This information is then
passed on to the presiding judge.111 The ex parte procedure provision is a
boon to the bottom line of trade secret owners, with little risk other than a
$2,000 Marshal’s fee and $1,000 bond.112
IV.

CONCLUSION

The DTSA’s ex parte provision is part of the overall trend to shift
costs associated with enforcement of IP rights and is a new avenue to stifle
competition. By relieving plaintiffs of many of the early costs associated
with trade secret misappropriation litigation, as well as the ability to remove
the necessary resources that its competitor needs to operate its business, the

106

18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(E) (West 2016).
Id. § (b)(2)(B).
108
Id. § (b)(2)(D).
109
At the court’s discretion, the Plaintiff can be ordered to pay the technical expert’s fee.
See, e.g., Mission Capital Advisors, LLC v. Romaka, No. 1:16-cv-05878-LLS, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (Santa Clara Law Digital Commons) (ordering Mission Capital
to “(b) recommend a neutral technical expert for the Court to appoint, upon the request of
the U.S. Marshal, to assist in the seizure; [and] (c) pay the fee of the neutral technical
expert.”).
110
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(iv).
111
Id.
112
Mission Capital Advisors, at *5 (Santa Clara Law Digital Commons).
107
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provision has the strong potential to become an anti-competitive arrow in
IP owners’ quivers. Only time will tell how this plays out.
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